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Abstract 
Land is not a mere physical resource in Ethiopia; rather it has a strong tie with social values and political power. 
Apparently, scholars in this particular area have largely focued on the residual effects of land dispossessions and 
the harsh incursions into the communal sanctities. Moreover, they paid an enormous attention to the effects of 
land grabbing on the economic, social and human rights of individuals. However, this article argues that less 
attention has been given to the role of land titlting in buiding the power of political elites in Ethiopia. In order to 
explore this, the article attempted to anlyze the three regimes in Ethiopia- the Emperial, Derg, and  EPRDF- and 
their land entitlment strategies as a means of power making and legitimization of the establishments. The artilce, 
thus, concludes that there have been a strong connection between land and power in the three regimes of 
Ethiopia and it maintains that land tilting strategies have been extensively used for the political interests and 
power grabbing objectives of the regimes. 
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Introduction 
Land deal, land grabbing, land rush, and land enclosures are the common terminologies popular among scholars 
to explain the massive anti-ecological transfer of the global south land resources to the global economic 
scavengers (GeislerandMakki, 2011). However, wide the conceptual battlefield is among diverse scholars that 
point how the terms are a misnomer and the social and economic ecologies are far-reaching, land transfer is 
being facilitated through flexible but destructive land entitlement procedures (Berry, 2002; and Borras and 
Franco, 2010). At the dawn of 2008, the global economic crisis and the consequent food and energy insecurity 
mined the global rush for the financial and material foundation which found fertile ground in the global south. 
This facilitated what Arrighi (1994) has called “systematic cycles of accumulation”.  
In Ethiopia, the dynamic process of land transfer that violated the human, economic, and social right of the 
local settlers has been rationalized through some basic alternating assumptions that transplanted land rights from 
one group to another. On the one hand, land entitlement transplantations have been justified on account of 
facilitating agricultural development through the attraction of foreign investors as was done by the Ethiopian 
government since the end of 2009 (Rahmato, 2011). Besides, land entitlement has also been subject global media 
attention and analysis in relation with the human right violation and extra-constitutional procedures that tend to 
favor the land scavengers in the low land frontiers of Ethiopia (Berry, 2002).  
Land has consumed a large tract of scholarly literature by sociologists, economists, land experts, and 
historians who invested a special focus on the residual effects of land dispossessions, and harsh incursions into 
the communal sanctities. Scholars also paid attention to the effects of land grabbing on the economic, social and 
human rights of individuals. Makki (2011 and 2012) finds that land enclosures in Ethiopia are expressed along 
with the parallel processes of state formation. In a similar vein, Rahmat (2011) noted that land and state in 
Ethiopia are inseparable in that the land has been a central element in determining the relationship between 
Church, monarchies, and peasants. On the other hand, Lavers (2012), Bezabih et al (2011), Adal (2000), Adal 
(2001),Deininger and Jin (2006), Deininger et al. (2009) noted how the state has been the major mediating actor 
in transferring land for reasons of agricultural investment and tenure insecurity problems. Nonetheless, an 
extensive and much deeper look at land titling and power building is not sufficiently addressed. Particularly, 
some of the basic mysteries behind land transfers, preferential land provisions, generous land transfers, and 
denial of land entitlements have to be found out in the process of land titling. Land titling has wide space and 
time dimensions along with global dynamics. Thus, it is essential to invest some scientific investigations in this 
regard.  
The basic purpose of this paper is not to explore the economic effects of land titling to foreign affiliates or 
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domestic patrimonial groups. Nor is the paper an investigation of the basic assertions made by scholars regarding 
the values and virtues of privatizing or communalizing land in Ethiopia. Rather, the study focuses on 
understanding how land titling has been a subject of contradictory claims and policy initiatives to build power 
for the political elites in Ethiopia. In due course, special regard is paid to explore how altering government 
arguments, elite’s legitimacy concerns, peasants’ or communities’ land virtues, and large scale land transfers 
have been maintained to preserve the power grabbing objectives. Consequently, the shifts and contradictions to 
the legal and juridical contradictions of land titling are studied to a certain extent.  
Therefore, an extensive study of how land has served as a means of power making and legitimization feeds 
a fresh insight to establish a more solid framework of rearranging the relationship between land and power. This 
leads the process of recapping and remaking land as a rationalizing force of developing an organic social 
metamorphism and political transformations. Thus, land entitlement as a shaping stone of land market, efficient 
land development, food security, and agricultural transformation has to be studied to re-sketch the political 
wavelengths.  
 
Theorizing Land Titling and Power Building 
The transition from the old mythical, and to some extent, genetically-justified sacred political oligarchies into the 
modern secular republic is understood to have been facilitated by the central role of land titling. The period up 
until the late Eighteenth century was typically characterized by the monopoly of land through sacred but random 
scripts, land titling has been carried out with the traditional religious principles uneasily mixed with political 
crowning. There is a complex intersection between land titling and power building. African countries in the post-
independence period kept on implementing the rules of land possession and consumption on account of building 
power. There has been intensive competition between the political power holders and the people who should 
determine and decide land entitlements (Barrey, 2002; Rahmato, 2008). As a result of this, it is said that the 
dynamics of political power in Africa begins and ends with land. 
Though the arguments that refute the existence of a peasant-landlord relationship in the African soil exist, 
contemporary political and sociological arguments stress the otherwise. Szymond Chodak in the “Birth of an 
African Peasantry” (1971) and Guy Hunter in “Modernizing Peasant Societies: a comparative study in Asia and 
Africa” (1969) noted the non-existence of peasant-land lord relationship and thus ignore how the political elites 
try to take control of land property entitlements and build their political power muscles. On the contrary, scholars 
of recent chronological lineage explain the ties of political power and land entitlements. In this regard, John 
Cohen’s “Ethiopia: a survey on the existence of a feudal peasantry” (1974), Donald Levine’s Wax and Gold: 
tradition and innovation in Ethiopian culture (1965), Frederick Simmons’ Northwest Ethiopia: peoples and 
economy (1960), George Lipsky et al.’s“A Pagan-Hebraick Peasantry of Ethiopia” (1969), Simon Messing’s 
“The highland plateau Amhara of Ethiopia” (1957), and Dan Bauer’s “Land, leadership and legitimacy among 
the IndertaTigray of Ethiopia” (1972) provide a conceptual understanding of how peasants and their land in 
Ethiopia have been instruments for power building. 
The major economic, demographic, and environmental factors that determine the distribution, market value, 
and productive potential of land have been secondary and derivative of political interests and power grabbing 
objectives in Africa (Rahmato, 2008). Land development has been a reflex of the general political ontology that 
is enclosed and patrimonial in nature. Therefore, the ability of a small circle of oligarchies controlling the 
general population has been executed through the control of land entitlements, acquired from and denied by the 
political elites. As a result, land has become a center of controversies and contradictions by the political elites. 
On the one hand, the struggle for power has been justified by the virtues of redistributing land, improving 
wellbeing, transforming livelihood (Cohen, 1974). On the other hand, power preservation has been made on the 
violation of the principles of equal distribution of land, the possession of land, and the control over land. Kroeber 
(1948) further explained that political power emerges from land-related entitlements in the following manners: 
the economic infrastructure of dominant elites is derived through taxation and land tributes, and political power 
emerges from the politician’s office.  
Regarding the species of feudalism and peasantry in which land entitlement is the entry to property and 
power accumulation, scholars noted that the Ethiopian reality resembles the conceptual taxonomies of Bloch and 
Beattie (1961). Frederick C. Gamst (1970) in “Peasantries and Elites without Urbanism: the Civilization of 
Ethiopia” finds out how Ethiopian politics is highly conjoined with the land entitlement and the corresponding 
feudalistic elements. In this regard, he finds the existence of the political dependence between the vassal and the 
landlord, survival of a weakened state, and the derivative nature of monarchical power from land property 
elements (ibid.). Therefore, it is in such a complex set of interactions between the political elites and the peasants 
that power generation and preservation takes place in Ethiopia. Consequently, the broad texture of land 
entitlement and the attendant power building becomes intelligible in the light of such conceptual clarifications.  
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How land titling has been a rationalizing instrument among Ethiopian political oligarchies, old and 
contemporary alike?  
The absolutist nature of the Ethiopian empires emerges from and is justified through land values. Land served as 
the most rationalizing realm, shaping the interaction of the people and the elites in Ethiopia. However, the 
procedures and dynamics are as fragile and confusing as the interests of the elites are. In some circumstances, 
land and its productive values have been heavily influenced by the policy intentions and personal whims of 
politicians. On the other extreme, land has also been serving as the most powerful reason to struggle for power-
sharing and conservation projects (Rahmato, 2008). The basic premise behind government policy conclusions, 
shifts, and contradictions is that land entitlements determine the legitimacy of the government’s power (Makki, 
2014). In this regard, land titling has assumed a privileged but confusing article in the various legal documents of 
the country (Lavers, 2012).  
 
Last Empire: The Emperor’s Quasi-Feudalistic Land Programs  
The emperor applied different principles that govern its relationship with the existing tribal leaders. In this regard, 
the emperor controlled two third or three fourths of the communal lands, then divided the remaining one among 
the chief leaders. In this way, the emperor tactically avoided any form of stiff resistance and maximized power 
centralization and legitimization, making the regional lords custodians of land grants by himself (Lavers, 2012). 
Imperial land grants were made on the basis of power contending potential of the grantee. As a result, nobles, 
emperor agents, various favored nobilities were granted land. In this way, the emperor was, apart from 
maximizing economic benefits through taxation, able to get the legitimacy of dangerous power contenders and/or 
imprison the potential of regional lords.  
During the reign of the emperor, there was some basic contrasts between the northern and southern 
ecological hemispheres in relation to the land entitlements. This geographical and social divide provided a 
lasting cultural and political significance which was rationalized with the basic assumptions of civilizing and 
modernizing the classic society (Makki, 2012). In the northern hemisphere, rather than dismantling the 
genealogical land entitlement tradition called rist1, the imperial species super-imposed gul2t system that provided 
gult holders the right of taxation and political monopoly over ristegna communities (Rahmao,1985, Crummey, 
2000, and Donham, 1986). Through gult system, the gult holders were entitled to have control over rist holders 
and to extract the surplus which was sent to the treasury port of the imperial palace residents. Gult holders’ 
power extends from this. They provided juridical, security, and administrative services based on the instructions 
of the emperor (Markakis and Ayele, 1976). The limited significance of the northern material foundation for the 
political power scripture of the imperial family turned attention towards the southern and southwestern ecologies 
which experienced different historical makeup (Makki, 2012).  
In the Southern and SoutheWestern part of the country, the most common type of land entitlement system 
employed under the imperial regime was the private tenure system. Addording to Cohen and Weintraub (1973), 
the private entitlements were formed when the emperor take the possession of  land conquered by its armies and 
granted the overwhelming majotity of it to a wide range of people and institutions. Land grants were made to the 
army memebers, administrators who came from the north as a civil servants of the emperor, peasants moving 
south because of land and environmental pressure in the north, local or native tribes that did not resist the 
conquest, indeginous village and clan chiefs to gain their support, a host of central and provincial elites close to 
the monarch and church officials and institutions to facilitate the expansion of the Coptic religion. Besides, those 
lands in these areas unoccupied by the aforementioned people and institutions were also considered to be state 
property and it was distributed to men of influence and power in the state apparatus (Adal, 2002). However, 
lands under private tenures were not private in the strict capitalist sense, rather all land under the private 
entitlement was originally state property and the state could take away whenever needed (Dessalegn, 1984 cited 
in Adal, 2002). 
The brief period of Italian occupation (1935 to 1941) had also its own effect on traditional land ownership 
in Ethiopia (Chala, 2016). According to Chala, the  most  victims  of  Italian  invasion were  not  poor peasants, 
but nobility and land owners. By appropriating gult and rist lands Italians distributed it to their loyal servants. As 
a result, the existing land entitlement system was disrupted. With this instance the nobility and other land owners 
who had been intimately associated with the emperor and ruling class families became victims of the Italian land 
grabbing strategy. By doing so, the Italians gravely weakened land owning nobility and in some parts of Ethiopia, 
they totally eliminated it (ibid.). 
In the post-liberation period-1941, land as the material foundation of the emperor’s power received some 
 
1 Rist is the right to claim a share of land based on kinship to a historical ancestor held in common with other rist holders (see Cohen, John 
and Weintraub, Dov, 1975,   Land and Peasants in Imperial Ethiopia: The Social Background of a Revolution for the detail)  
2Gult rights over land were land entitlements given to members of the ruling elite as a reward to loyal service to their lord and to religious 
institutions as endowments (see Hoben, Allan, 1973, Land Tenure among the Amhara of Ethiopia:  The Dynamics of Cognisant Descent,  
Chicago: The University of Chicago for the detail) 
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changes. The changes further eroded the material basis of the gult holders and made them less important. The 
1944 new taxation system introduced by the emperor reduced the role of gult holders and systematically 
centralized the collection of resources from land (Markakis and Ayele, 1976). Accordingly, the Ministry of 
Finance robbed the gultegna of their land entitlement and land titling acquired a modern form of processing 
(Rahmato, 1985).  
 
The Second Republic: Derg’s Disguised Land Capitalism  
The 1975 land reform of the Derg has been considered by many as a radical measure that has abolished the 
tenant-landlord relations in Ethiopia (Adal, 2002). Proclaiming itself as the group that maintains the country’s 
sovereignty in the brink of political turmoil, Derg (a group of military juntas) made a reform on land tenure, 
which was the factor behind the downfall of the emperor. That measure brought the whole peasants except the 
landlords to euphoria. In a dramatic fashion, Derg assumed an escalating legitimacy from the rural inhabitants 
which made the majority parcel of the population (Crummey, 2000). Nevertheless, the stated objectives of 
egalitarianism, productivity, and efficiency of smallholder agriculture did not materialize as the land tenure 
policy was not a program of “Land to the Tiller” as loudly echoed by the students. It was rather a program of 
land to the politicians, a program of building the material foundation of power, with a teleological impact of 
shrinking the power of those outside the political circle (Donham, 1986).  
The land tenure policy measure was nothing but a replacement of the old characters with new characters. 
Land to the tiller policy with its superficial nature simplified the existing old mix of state, church, and 
landlordism and brought it under the armpit of the military junta. In the beginning, the proclamations appear 
innocent. The government showed a good face to bring a uniform and egalitarian distribution of land rights 
(Makki, 2012). The proclamation reads as follows:  
As of the effective date of this Proclamation, all rural lands shall be the collective property of the 
Ethiopian people (Sub Article, 1). No person or business organization or any other organization shall 
hold rural land in private ownership (Sub Article, 2). No person may by sale, exchange, succession, 
mortgage, antichresis, lease or otherwise transfer his holding to another; provided that upon the death 
of the holder the wife or husband or minor children of the deceased or where these are not present, 
any child of the deceased who has attained majority, shall have the right to use the land (Article, 5) 
(PMAC, 1975).  
The rural land proclamation provided a monopoly of land titling to the Derg administrative groups, 
destroying the communal sanctities. This avoided any form of the lowest form of land administration (Clapham, 
1988). Rather, land became the custody of the socialist orientation of the Derg officials who designed socialism 
and land tenure policy to appeal to the domestic and international legitimacy (Donham, 1998). Ignoring the 
repetitive advice of the Chinese and Soviet friends, the Derg officials rushed, in the absence of an organized 
bureaucracy, to look after land property through peasant associations and Zemecha programs (Keller, 2008). 
Thus, it engaged in the program of pasteurizing the power of titling land. This was an exhibition of the Derg’s 
intention of building the material/property estate of its power, which has been a tradition in Ethiopia for so long. 
When the initial programs of land titling became ineffective, the military junta injected a series of other 
proclamations designed to bring the means of production under its control (Rahmato, 2011). Producer 
cooperatives were destined to fulfill the political thrusts of the government. They emerged to implement the land 
titling objectives of the military junta (Rahmato, 1984).  
After the first Zemecha, more and more property owning peasants began to work at arm’s length from the 
government (Crummey, 2000). Colonel Mengistu designated this as “rampant individualism and Petty 
bourgeoisie” (Keller, 2008). This created a threat of losing power grip over the material foundation of its power. 
The Derg, as a result, begun rearrangement procedures: stipulation of proclamation and establishment of 
organizations (Rahmato, 2009). The proclamation helped to legalize and reclaim the power of the Derg by 
providing a ground to control property owning peasants. This was done through the deployment of various 
government agents in various places. Keller (2008) explains as follows: 
The proclamation set up the Central Planning Supreme Council under the direction of PMG 
Chairman Mengistu. The organization consisted of a congress with representatives from all parts of 
the country, an executive committee, a secretariat, a provincial development campaign and, planning 
office, plus similar offices at the regional and district levels. Delegates to the congress and employees 
in the other institutions represented all major interests in society. The permanent staff of the NRDC 
was around 1,000 by the end of 1981, and included seven or eight Soviet advisers.57 importantly, 
however, the new organization appeared top-heavy with Derg personnel, and bureaucrats far 
outnumbered workers and representatives from other mass organizations (Keller, 2008).  
Nevertheless, the residual effect of the proclamation was dependent on the power building mission of the 
Derg officials. The land policy measures, rather than changing the structure of hierarchy in favor of the peasants, 
were taken as a deceptive provincial flavor for the majority of the peasants and the building of the legitimacy of 
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the government. Ruthless intrusions into the livelihood base of the pastoralist communities brought a tragic 
obstruction to the achievement of the objectives of “Land to the Tiller” calls. Core-periphery relationships were 
architected in a new form but with similar draconian impacts (Markakis, 2008; and Makki, 2012).  
The “Public Ownership of Rural Land Proclamation” nationalized all rural land and set out to redistribute it 
to its tillers and to organize farmers in cooperatives, thereby abolishing exploitative landlord-tenant relations so 
pertinent under the imperial regime. However many shortcomings of the land reform are also cited, though it 
seems that they could be related more to the general agrarian policies of the Derg than the land reform per se. 
many scholars argue that the land tenure system since then has badly affected the country’s agricultural 
production and sustainable land use in the lowland part of the country (see Adal 2002, Ambaye, 2012). The 
problems associated with Derge’s land reforms include: land fragmentation as a result of repeated redistribution, 
repeated redistribution gave rise to and exacerbated tenure insecurity among peasant households. 
 
The Second Republic: EPRDF’s Capitalistic Land Enclosure for Power Enclosure 
The EPRDF regime, immediately upon coming to power, began to re-knit the diverse Ethiopian communities 
under the overarching sanctities of the polyglot constitution. Harboring a large pack of debate, the constitution 
declared land as the sacred property of the state and nations and nationalities which are the Alfa Omega of the 
regime. The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution romantically entitles land as the property of the state as follows and 
entitles the people with land that cannot be arbitrarily robbed.  
The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively vested 
in the State, and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property of the Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other means of exchange (Sub-article, 3). 
Ethiopian peasants have the right to obtain land without payment and the protection against eviction 
from their possession. The implementation of this provision shall be specified by law (Sub-article, 40 
(FDRE Constitution).  
 
Spatial Based Irregular Land Entitlement Treatments Under the EPRDF Regime 
A contrast of the central/core part of the country and the peripheral areas reveals a tragic story. The government 
has been employing different processes of power building procedures in the two places. The basic principle 
employed in the core areas, owing to historical, and cultural contexts, was the formation of hierarchical, 
dominant-subordinate land ownership rights (Jemma, 2001; and Clapham, 2018). On the contrary, the last 
frontiers of peripheral areas hosted the theorem of deforesting communal land titles and replacing them with 
government introduced juridical modern titling (Makki, 2012). 
In the core areas, land registration and titling processes were started, with good performance in the first 
two-three years in terms of governance, representation, and women empowerment (Deninger and Ali, 2008). 
Gradually, however, the land registration process brought no significant impacts upon the lives of the peasant as 
predicted by economists (Chinigo, 2015). In the absence of absolute land ownership rights, the peasants were 
systematically convinced to take the land registration for granted, and give their blessing to the government. 
Their land ownership became submissive to the government’s heavy hands as the land registration was 
introduced without the provision of adequate tenure security (Crewett and Korf 2008). In this way, the 
government brought the death of one of the powerful inputs of capital generation- incentive and security. 
Peasants, in the absence of genuine government efforts, were advised to attend the process that facilitates the 
power preserving the intention of the government (Lefort 2012, 681; and Holden and Tefera 2008, 32). Peasants 
allowed enjoying the short term euphoria of land registration while the government was building its muscle. 
Hammond calls such processes as a “Strategies of Invisibilization” (2008).  
In the peripheral areas, the government began to play both comedy and tragedy characters. It held various 
meetings, concerts, and consultations with the local community. Nevertheless, the local communities were 
forced to become inhabitants of artificial social structures that led them to suffer from landlessness, 
powerlessness, hunger, and displacement (Deininger, Ali, and Alemu, 2011). Various programs were introduced 
to slowly drag the pastoralist settlers into their death camps, such as involuntary villagization and forced 
resettlement (Bezabih et al., 2011). This is grossly contradictory to the basic principles laid out in the 
constitution and the rural land proclamation which altogether affirm the right of peasants to have land (Holden 
and Tefera, 2008). 
 
Coercive Legitimization Process by Weakening Delegitimizing Groups  
In a systematic and silent mode, the very existence of the rural community has been made dependent on the 
provision of legitimacy to the ruling party.  In this regard, land has been employed as a powerful weapon to 
make the rural communities who side with opposition parties to drop their opposition and accept the power of 
the ruling government (Hammond, 2008).  
An exchange between the government and the rural community facilitated social and economic 
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rearrangement of the rural inhabitants. The steps are silent. First, the rural communities are made to depend on 
the government for property rights which made the foundation of livelihood of the majority of Ethiopians. 
Therefore, these peasants are forced to have subsistence mode of livelihood which compels them to be 
vulnerable to famine, drought, and lack of productivity. Then, these people are encouraged to give their political 
allegiance and affiliation to the ruling government in exchange for food aid and non-transforming risk 
management programs (Deininger, Ali, and Alemu, 2011).  
 
Legal Structures: Biasness and Openness  
In the 1990s, the EPRDF government has been showing favor and strong affection towards peasants, expressed 
in terms of small holder-focused agricultural policy. Land policies, agricultural policies, and package programs 
were all peasant-friendly (Rahmato, 2011). The 1995 constitution and the Rural Land Proclamation provided 
shelter for the government’s power building objectives. It goes like this: Land is the common property of the 
Ethiopian nations, nationalities, and peoples (FDRE, 1995, Article 40(3)); and a smallholder whose land is 
expropriated for public activities is compensated in three forms, property situating on the land, permanent 
improvement made on the land and displacement compensation (FDRE, Article 40(8); Federal Rural Land 
Proclamation, Article 7 and 8). Nonetheless, something is still mysterious. What about the taking of the land? 
The taking of land entitlement by the peasants is the most powerful resource left unanswered. In addressing this 
concern, Tura (2018) in his study claimed that laws that justify land titling for the community are flawed and 
incomplete which is exploited by the government to maximize its power port.  
Gradually, however, the government began to manipulate the controversial land policy stated in the 
constitution. A cyclical process of integrating the smallholder farmers into the global commercial market has 
changed the fate of the peasants for the worst. Dispossession through displacement and differentiation began to 
take place in various parts of the country in spite of strong global and domestic critics (Makki, 2012). The neo-
imperial negotiation process with the global investors has exposed the peasants to various forms of expropriation, 
displacement, dispossession, and famine (Hagman and Abbink, 2012). The political motives behind such 
programs are tragic and self-serving one.  
In the post-2005 election, arguments against the position of the regime were treated with imprisonment and 
suppression. The arguments were taken as delegitimizing attempts that further deteriorate the legitimacy of the 
government both in the eyes of the donor countries and domestic peasants (Rahmato, 2011; Makki, 2012). As a 
result, the government has taken a patrimonial assumption towards the rural populace in that the peasants are to 
be protected by the state power and policy, which is indirectly a mechanism to establish the rural base of power. 
Land redistribution under the overwhelming control of the state has strong historical backgrounds. Land as a 
means of power accession has become a means of remaining in power by enjoying a quantitative advantage over 
experts and opposition forces. 
The EPRDF's land policy, which brought the state at the top of the pyramid of land control, made the 
peasants depend on the will and whim of the state officials. Partly, this provided the government a demographic 
advantage, in terms of legitimacy, over any form of power contenders and made it the Alfa Omega guarantor of 
access to livelihood for the majority of Ethiopians. The government carefully takes advantage of the interception 
between land property and election campaigns. In many circumstances, when election is coming, or when its 
legitimacy is deteriorating, the government began to quickly craft land-focused policy initiatives (Hammoond, 
2008; Hagman and Abbink, 2012; andLavers, 2012) which are for the most part taken as virtues and benign 
attempts of the government.  
The government was massively intervening in the livelihood base of pastoralists, last frontiers, with the 
presumption that these landsare empty waiting for as Makki (2012) called it" the redemptive role of the 
government". The basic driving motive behind this is not economical neither public responsibility but rather a 
program of remaking international image so as to remain in power,untouched and unchallenged. This is what we 
can call legitimizing the illegitimate discourse of developing empty lands.  
 
Commercialization of Agriculture: For whom?  
The EPRDF government repeatedly announced its focus to transform the agricultural sector by introducing 
commercialization of small holder farmers (Rahmato, 2008; Zenawi, 2006). However, the government began to 
engage in large scale land grabbing from the last frontiers on the reasons of commercialization of land in the 
country (Lavers, 2012; Makki, 2011). Against the human right, property right, and survival of the local settlers, 
the government brought high business profile investors both domestic and foreign ones to do whatever they want 
on the land of these local settlers (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011). Gambella, Somali, Afar, and Omo river settlers 
faced this harsh reality. These large scale investors have, in one way or another, strong link with the governing 
officials. While the government provides security service, special protection, convincing processes, and 
settlement of local disputes either through deceptive dialogues or coercive mechanisms, the large scale 
commercial investors have been executing their contract (Tamrat, 2010). The consequence of which has been 
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fueling the power vessel of the regime. Anyone outside the enclosed structure has, nevertheless, been brutally 
pushed to the edge.  
The tables below demonstrate how land transfer was aggressively and massively conducted in the various 
core and peripheral zones of Ethiopia.  
Table 1 Large scale land transfers in Ethiopia  
Investor Name/ Nationality Region Investment 
Type 
Land 
Transfer 
Capital 
Registered 
Land Rent Agreement 
Company Name Area of 
Ha 
(Mill 
Birr) 
Per Year 
(Birr) 
Signed 
Date 
Adama Ethiopian SNNPR Cotton 18516 323 2,925,528.00 12/18/02 
Daniel 
Agri.Dev.Enterprise 
Diaspora SNNPR Cotton, grains 5000 65 790,426.60 1/11/02 
Lucci Agricultural Ethiopian SNNPR Cotton 4003 83 632,474.00 3/30/02 
Development PLC        
Mela Agri. Dev. 
PLC 
Ethiopian SNNPR Cotton 5000 42 790,000.00 3/10/02 
Rahwa Ethiopian SNNPR Cotton, grains 3000 14 474,000.00 9/7/02 
Reta Diaspora SNNPR Cotton, grains 2137 13 337,740.00 1/11/02 
Ruchi Indian Gambella Soy beans 25000 1451 2,775,000.00 7/2/02 
TsegayeDemoze 
Agri. Dev. 
Diaspora SNNPR Cotton, sesame, 
soyabeans 
1000 9 158,000.00 5/17/02 
White Field Indian SNNPR Cotton 10000 32 1,580,000.00 11/25/02 
BHO Indian Gambella Edible oil 
crops 
27000 918 2,997,000.00 9/3/02 
Sannati Indian Gambella Rice 10000 160 1,580,000.00 1/24/03 
Verdanta Indian Gambella Tea 3012 631 334,332.00 8/13/02 
Shmporji Indian B/Gumuz Pongamia 
(Biofuel) 
50000 984 7,170,000.00 6/22/02 
Keystone Diaspora B/Gumuz Horticultural, 
crops 
431 66 307,134.91 4/26/02 
CLC (Spentex) Indian B/Gumuz& 
Amara 
Cotton 25000 1177 5,548,750.05 4/17/02 
Access Capital Ethiopian B/Gumuz Sesame beans 5000 61 3,288,750.00 2/1/03 
KaruturiAgro Indian Gambella Palm cereals, 100000 2110 2,000,000.00 2/26/03 
Products PLC   rice, sugar 
cane 
    
Saudi Star 
Agricultural Dev. 
Saudi Gambella Rice 10000 37640 3,000,000.00 2/22/03 
HuanaDafengyuan China Gambella Sugar cane 25000 2973 3,950,000.00 11/5/02 
Agriculture        
Kehedam Trading Diaspora B/Gumuz Oil crops 3000 13 1/013,400.00 3/28/03 
Dr. Tamie Hadgu Diaspora SNNPR Cotton, seeds 5000 74 790,000.00 4/9/03 
Bruhoye Ethiopian B/Gumuz Cotton, soy 
beans 
5000 60 960,000.00 4/8/03 
ASKY Agricultural Ethiopian B/Gumuz Cotton 3000 60 333,000.00 7/13/03 
Development        
Tracon Trading Pvt. 
Ltd/Co. 
Ethiopian B/Gumuz Cotton 5000 61 1,972,500.00 7/13/03 
Source: Ethiopian Agricultural Portal: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (2011). www.eap.gov.et 
in Makki (2012). 
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Table 2 A partial list of large scale land transfers in Ethiopia (except Gambella).  
Investor Foreign and 
domestic  
Land Size 
(Hectares)  
Crops Location 
Al Habesh Pakistan 28,000 Sugar estate Wollega, Oro 
Ambassel Domestic 10,000 Biofuel crops Metekel, BS 
B&D Food USA 18,000 Sugar estate Awi, Amhara 
Chadha Agro India 122,000 Sugar, 
Biofuel 
Oromia 
Djibouti Gov’t Djibouti 3,000 Food crops Bale, Oromia 
Dubai World Dubai 5,000 Tea Illubabor, Oro 
E. Africa Agric Domestic 6,500 Food crops Pawe, BeniShangul 
Emami Biotech India 80,000 Biofuel crops Oromia 
FinoteSelaam Domestic 5,000 Sesame Guba, Benishangul 
Flora EcoPower German 13,000 Biofuel crops E. Harage, Oro 
Fri El Green Italy 30,000 Biofuel crops Omo Valley, SNNP 
Global Energy Israel 10,000 Biofuel Wollaita, SNNP 
IDC Invest Danish 15,000 Biofuel Assossa, BS 
Kanan D Hills India 10,000 Tea SNNP 
Karuturi India 11,000 Rice, Biofuel Bako, Oromia 
P. Morrell USA 10,000 Wheat Bale, Oromia 
N. Bank Egypt Egypt 20,000 Food crops Afar 
OmoSheleko Domestic 5,500 Cotton, palm SNNP 
PetroPalm German 50,000 Biofuel Rayitu, Bale, 
Oromia 
SHAMPORJI India 50,000 Biofuel BeniShangul 
Spentex India 25,000 Cotton BeniShangul 
Sun Biofuels UK 5,000 Biofuel Wollaita, SNNP 
Sun Bio (NBC) UK 80,000 Biofuel Metekel, B.S 
Sunrise Indust India 15,000 Food Oromia 
Tomaisin Israel 10,000 Food crops Oromia 
Vatic India 20,000 Biofuel Borena, Oromia 
United Farm Bus Domestic 3,000 Food crops Bako, Oromia 
Yehudi Hayun Israel 10,000 Biofuel Oromia 
Source: Findings from field visits, MOARD, MELCA Mahiber 2008, local press reports, InRahmato (2011). 
 
Conclusion   
Modern land tenure regimes in Ethiopia fall into three far-reaching time periods. Before 1975, land tenure was 
based on a feudal system where land was controlled in the hands of absentee proprietors, tenure rights were 
greatly insecure, and arbitrary evictions took place. Following the upheaval of the imperial regime in 1974, the 
Marxist-oriented government (the Derge) moved possession of all rural land to the state for the supply of use 
rights to the peasants through the local peasant associations. The further transfer of this land right was highly 
limited due to the transfer through sales, lease, exchange, or mortgage was banned, and inheritance was strictly 
restricted. Tenure security was more weakened by the peasant associations’ and other authorities’ ability to 
redistribute land. The popular students’ movement with the quest of “land to the tiller” was hijacked by the 
socialist Derge’s peasants association. The government that took power in 1991 following the fall of the Derge – 
while committed to a free-market philosophy – has made little practical change to farmers’ land rights, which are 
still considered inadequate. 
As far as the modern Ethiopian land tenure (land titling) is concerned, much of the power over the land 
resource and sole ownership is vested in the hands of the regimes. Land grabbing, land acquisition, expropriation 
without proper compensation explains the recent history of land policy in Ethiopia. The ordinary citizens are still 
not possessors of the land though they give a high value to it.  
Overall, there have been less progressive policy changes over the years within the context of the state-
controlled tenure system. Only a few changes of land tenure policy including halting or slowing land 
redistribution or adjustment; broadening land access through permitting bequeathing land and limited transaction 
inland market, setting minimum farm size and certifying land rights were advocated. However, such policy 
action has been largely reactive and tentative (USAID/Ethiopia, 2004). The constitutionality of some of these 
expanded rights is also questionable since the 1995 constitution. For example, the constitution still prohibits any 
transfer of land other than through state-mandated institutions. The current policies continue to restrict ways of 
accessing land, emphasize on administrative-based land allocation, show weakness in provision and protection of 
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land rights, restrict the private development of land resources, and limit indigenous institutions to economize on 
scarce land resources. 
Public policy has an important role in the future, but it needs an informed and a balanced view that 
emphasizes on searching for equitable but efficient and sustainable tenure arrangements that are mediated 
through the market place. As detailed in (Ambaye, 2012), major policy changes are necessary that expand ways 
to acquire land and facilitate efficiency-enhancing land transfers, enhance secured control in land rights, permit 
tradable land rights and reduce transaction costs, improve management of common resources and joint action, 
eliminate political and administrative restrictions on access to land, and develop land and other factor markets in 
tandem. 
Overall, throughout the last half a century and more, the regimes which ruled the country have made use of 
land as an important instrument to build and consolidate their power. This practice is still persistent as the 
incumbent government constitutionally decreed land as the property of the state and manupulates it in the 
process of strengthening its might.  
 
The way forward  
Concerns with the insecurity of tenure are foremost related to the constancy of tenure and restricted applications 
of land rights (Ambaye, 2012,Adal, 2002, USAID/Ethiopia, 2004). The thrust of public policy is hence to create 
stable and secured tenure systems that permit farmers to fully exercise rights in land at low enforcement and 
transaction costs. Public responses so far involve bequeathing use rights to land, halting or slowing redistribution 
of land to create a climate of stability, titling use rights in some regional states, and accepting, in principle, 
compensation for added value in land in case of government expropriation. 
Policy deliberation should be participatory and must consult all the stakeholders. Moreover, informed 
public policy is critical to minimize costly policy error. Public policy is likely to be correct and effective when it 
is guided by empirical and analytical policy researches. Policy prescription requires asking the right research 
question, diagnosing the underlying source of the problem, matching the right prescription to the cause of the 
problem, weighting the costs and benefits associated with policy choice, and assessing the institutional and 
human capacity to implement, monitor and evaluate performance. 
There are important policy prescriptions in the current federal and regional laws that are based on thin 
empirical evidence such as setting minimum farm size, choice of land allocation criteria, valuation of land and 
compensation. The debate on land policy has to also move out of the realm of political ideology and be guided 
by empirical based approach that finds equitable but efficient tenure system that is mediated through the market 
place. The challenge ahead is to strengthen these markets to pursue the aforementioned goals. 
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